DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBeckmann, Klaus Bertram-
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-14T07:41:12Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-14T07:41:12Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.otherhttps://ub.hsu-hh.de/DB=1.8/XMLPRS=N/PPN?PPN=1017783144-
dc.identifier.otherhttps://ub.hsu-hh.de/DB=1.8/XMLPRS=N/PPN?PPN=1011224933-
dc.description.abstractThe present paper proposes a myopic, boundedly rational heuristic for individual decision-making in differential game settings. I demonstrate that this type of behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated stage games without a state variable if the stage game is strategically symmetric. Two examples are used to illustrate the application of the heuristic in differential games.de_DE
dc.description.sponsorshipVWL, insb. Ökonomik des öffentlichen Sektorsde_DE
dc.language.isoengde_DE
dc.publisherUniversitätsbibliothek der HSU/UniBwHde_DE
dc.relation.ispartofDiskussionspapier / Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehrede_DE
dc.titleBounded rationality in differential gamesde_DE
dc.typeWorking Paperde_DE
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue178de_DE
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceHamburgde_DE
dc.identifier.urlhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/184875-
dc.identifier.urlhttps://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/wp-content/uploads/sites/572/2017/12/hsu-wp-vwl-178.pdf-
local.submission.typeonly-metadatade_DE
hsu.opac.importopac-2017-
item.fulltext_sNo Fulltext-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.openairetypeWorking Paper-
crisitem.author.deptPräsidialbereich-
crisitem.author.deptUniversitätsleitung-
crisitem.author.parentorgPräsident*in-
crisitem.author.parentorgHelmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg-
Appears in Collections:2017
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