DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Beckmann, Klaus Bertram | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-14T07:41:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-14T07:41:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The present paper proposes a myopic, boundedly rational heuristic for individual decision-making in differential game settings. I demonstrate that this type of behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated stage games without a state variable if the stage game is strategically symmetric. Two examples are used to illustrate the application of the heuristic in differential games. | de_DE |
dc.description.sponsorship | VWL, insb. Ökonomik des öffentlichen Sektors | de_DE |
dc.language.iso | eng | de_DE |
dc.publisher | Universitätsbibliothek der HSU/UniBwH | de_DE |
dc.relation.ispartof | Diskussionspapier / Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre | de_DE |
dc.title | Bounded rationality in differential games | de_DE |
dc.type | Working Paper | de_DE |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue | 178 | de_DE |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplace | Hamburg | de_DE |
dc.identifier.url | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/184875 | - |
dc.identifier.url | https://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/wp-content/uploads/sites/572/2017/12/hsu-wp-vwl-178.pdf | - |
local.submission.type | only-metadata | de_DE |
hsu.opac.import | opac-2017 | - |
hsu.identifier.ppn | 1011224933 | - |
hsu.identifier.ppn | 1017783144 | - |
item.fulltext_s | No Fulltext | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.openairetype | Working Paper | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
crisitem.author.dept | Präsidialbereich | - |
crisitem.author.dept | Universitätsleitung | - |
crisitem.author.parentorg | Universitätsleitung | - |
crisitem.author.parentorg | Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg | - |
Appears in Collections: | 3 - Reported Publications |
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