| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Maaser, Nicola F. | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Paetzel, Fabian | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Traub, Stefan | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-15T04:59:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-10-15T04:59:51Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning. © 2019 Elsevier Inc. | - |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economics | - |
| dc.language.iso | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Academic Press | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | - |
| dc.subject | Coalition Formation | - |
| dc.subject | Legislative Bargaining | - |
| dc.subject | Experiment | - |
| dc.title | Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010 | - |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume | 117 | - |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue | September | - |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart | 433 | - |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend | 450 | - |
| local.submission.type | only-metadata | - |
| item.grantfulltext | none | - |
| item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
| item.fulltext_s | No Fulltext | - |
| item.openairetype | Article | - |
| item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
| crisitem.author.dept | Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economics | - |
| crisitem.author.orcid | 0000-0002-5669-7316 | - |
| crisitem.author.parentorg | Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 3 - Publication references (without fulltext) | |
CORE Recommender
User Tools
Items in openHSU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.