DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMaaser, Nicola F.-
dc.contributor.authorPaetzel, Fabian-
dc.contributor.authorTraub, Stefan-
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-15T04:59:51Z-
dc.date.available2019-10-15T04:59:51Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256-
dc.description.abstractOne feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning. © 2019 Elsevier Inc.de_DE
dc.description.sponsorshipVolkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economicsde_DE
dc.language.isoengde_DE
dc.publisherAcademic Pressde_DE
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behaviorde_DE
dc.subjectCoalition Formationde_DE
dc.subjectLegislative Bargainingde_DE
dc.subjectExperimentde_DE
dc.titlePower illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysisde_DE
dc.typeArticlede_DE
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010-
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume117de_DE
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issueSeptemberde_DE
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart433de_DE
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend450de_DE
local.submission.typeonly-metadata-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.fulltext_sNo Fulltext-
crisitem.author.deptVolkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economics-
crisitem.author.orcid0000-0002-5669-7316-
crisitem.author.parentorgFakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften-
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