Title: Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis
Authors: Maaser, Nicola F.
Paetzel, Fabian 
Traub, Stefan  
Affiliation: Aarhus Universitet
VWL, insb. Ökonomik des öffentlichen Sektors
Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economics
Language: en
Subject (DDC): Wirtschaft
Subject: Coalition Formation
Legislative Bargaining
Experiment
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: Academic Press
Document Type: Article
Journal / Series / Working Paper (HSU): Games and Economic Behavior 
Volume: 117
Issue: September
Page Start: 433
Page End: 450
Abstract: 
One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning. © 2019 Elsevier Inc.
Organization Units (connected with the publication): Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economics 
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010
Rights: 4.0 deutsch
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