Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis
Publication date
2019
Document type
Research article
Author
Organisational unit
ISSN
Series or journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Periodical volume
117
Periodical issue
September
First page
433
Last page
450
Part of the university bibliography
✅
Keyword
Coalition Formation
Legislative Bargaining
Experiment
Abstract
One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning. © 2019 Elsevier Inc.
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