Publication:
Tax evasion and cognitive dissonance

cris.virtual.departmentHelmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
cris.virtual.department#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtual.departmentbrowseHelmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
cris.virtual.departmentbrowseHelmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
cris.virtualsource.department9cf9b09a-7f28-408a-a756-84616581af49
cris.virtualsource.department#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
dc.contributor.authorBeckmann, Klaus Bertram
dc.contributor.authorGattke, Susan
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractWe introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the presence of cognitive dissonanceattenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public statement of the 'admissible' degree of tax evasion, which, in turn, they use to influence the probability of detection. Some potential policy conclusions and extensions are discussed.
dc.description.versionNA
dc.identifier.urihttps://openhsu.ub.hsu-hh.de/handle/10.24405/4372
dc.identifier.urlhttps://hdl.handle.net/10419/98419
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherHelmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
dc.relation.journalDiskussionspapier / Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre
dc.relation.orgunitVWL, insb. Ökonomik des öffentlichen Sektors
dc.rights.accessRightsmetadata only access
dc.subjectPublic Signal
dc.titleTax evasion and cognitive dissonance
dc.typeWorking paper
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceHamburg
dspace.entity.typePublication
hsu.uniBibliography
oaire.citation.issue142
Files