Publication:
Tax evasion and cognitive dissonance

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cris.customurl 4372
cris.virtual.department Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
cris.virtual.department #PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtual.departmentbrowse Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
cris.virtual.departmentbrowse Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
cris.virtual.departmentbrowse Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
cris.virtualsource.department 9cf9b09a-7f28-408a-a756-84616581af49
cris.virtualsource.department #PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
dc.contributor.author Beckmann, Klaus Bertram
dc.contributor.author Gattke, Susan
dc.date.issued 2014
dc.description.abstract We introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the presence of cognitive dissonanceattenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public statement of the 'admissible' degree of tax evasion, which, in turn, they use to influence the probability of detection. Some potential policy conclusions and extensions are discussed.
dc.description.version NA
dc.identifier.uri https://openhsu.ub.hsu-hh.de/handle/10.24405/4372
dc.identifier.url https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98419
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
dc.relation.journal Diskussionspapier / Helmut-Schmidt-Universität / Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre
dc.relation.orgunit VWL, insb. Ökonomik des öffentlichen Sektors
dc.rights.accessRights metadata only access
dc.subject Public Signal
dc.title Tax evasion and cognitive dissonance
dc.type Working paper
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplace Hamburg
dspace.entity.type Publication
hsu.uniBibliography ✅
oaire.citation.issue 142
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