Lieferverweigerung, Zugangsbeschränkung, Kosten-Preis-Schere und Selbstbevorzugung
Birds of a feather flock together
Publication date
2025-08-01
Document type
Forschungsartikel
Author
Organisational unit
Publisher
Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG
Series or journal
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb
ISSN
Periodical volume
75
Periodical issue
7-8
First page
384
Last page
392
Part of the university bibliography
✅
Language
German
Abstract
Im europäischen Recht hat sich seit Bronner eine strenge Handhabung der Voraussetzungen für eine Lieferverweigerung (insbesondere: Unerlässlichkeit) entwickelt. Das führte dazu, dass andere Fallgruppen nach Möglichkeit von der Lieferverweigerung abgegrenzt wurden: die Kosten-Preis-Schere, die Selbstbevorzugung und zuletzt (im Leitlinienentwurf und Android Auto) die Zugangsbeschränkung. Der Beitrag weist auf die Diskontinuitäten und Fehlanreize hin, die durch diese künstliche Separierung erzeugt werden. Er plädiert dafür, in Anlehnung an die Rechtsprechung des Kartellsenats am BGH, Fälle der expliziten und impliziten Zugangsgewährung auf einem kontinuierlichen Spektrum anzuordnen und die Entscheidung von einer Gesamtwürdigung und umfassenden Abwägung aller beteiligten Interessen abhängig zu machen.
Refusal to Supply, Access Restrictions, Margin Squeeze and Self-Preferencing: Birds of a Feather Flock Together
Since the Bronner decision, EU law has developed an overly strict approach to refusal to deal cases, requiring, in particular, indispensability. This motivated the Court to distinguish other categories of cases from refusals to deal: margin squeeze, self-referencing, and now (in the Commission draft guidelines and Android Auto) access restrictions. The article points to discontinuities and perverse incentives caused by the artificial separation of these categories of explicit or implicit refusals to deal. It suggests – as did AG Jacobs in para. 57 – a “careful balancing of conflicting considerations”, or, more precisely, a comprehensive balancing along the lines of the practice of the Cartel Senate at the German Federal Court of Justice. Whether or not access has already been granted is a relevant factor in this assessment, but should not result in a qualitatively different test.
Since the Bronner decision, EU law has developed an overly strict approach to refusal to deal cases, requiring, in particular, indispensability. This motivated the Court to distinguish other categories of cases from refusals to deal: margin squeeze, self-referencing, and now (in the Commission draft guidelines and Android Auto) access restrictions. The article points to discontinuities and perverse incentives caused by the artificial separation of these categories of explicit or implicit refusals to deal. It suggests – as did AG Jacobs in para. 57 – a “careful balancing of conflicting considerations”, or, more precisely, a comprehensive balancing along the lines of the practice of the Cartel Senate at the German Federal Court of Justice. Whether or not access has already been granted is a relevant factor in this assessment, but should not result in a qualitatively different test.
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