Decentralized sequencing of jobs on a single machine
Publication date
2017-02-13
Document type
Konferenzbeitrag
Author
Organisational unit
Universität Siegen
Scopus ID
Conference
IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence 2016 (IEEE SSCI 2016) ; Athens, Greece ; December 6–9, 2016
Publisher
IEEE
Peer-reviewed
✅
Part of the university bibliography
Nein
Language
English
Abstract
There is a finite number of non-cooperating clients competing for execution of their jobs by a single service provider in order to minimize job completion time costs. The clients can move their jobs to complete earlier in a given sequence. However, they have to compensate the cost increase to the other clients whose jobs are completed later due to this move. All clients are assumed to be fully risk averse. A game mechanism is suggested, such that no client has an incentive to claim false cost and a social criterion, i.e. The minimization of the total cost of all clients, is addressed. A polynomial time algorithm that finds a game equilibrium is suggested and embedded into the game mechanism. Computational tests analyze the performance and practical suitability of the resulting mechanism. We outline potential directions for future research in a similar setting in a parallel service environment.
Version
Published version
Access right on openHSU
Metadata only access