Stephen, Matthew David

Scholars and pundits focusing on the changing international order and its possible fragmentation often pay little attention to the manifold relationships between international organizations (IOs). Neglecting inter-organizational relationships, we argue, biases discussions towards doomsday predictions and reinforces the perception of global fragmentation. In this Forum, we address these biases by bringing together two strands of IR scholarship: power rivalry/transition and regime complexity. We do so by introducing the concept of organizational (dis)entanglements. An examination of how more and less powerful national and international policymakers engage and disengage IOs, highlights processes of reinforcing, muddling through, or undermining various ongoing order-making initiatives. The individual contributions examine organizational (dis)entanglements by highlighting actors’ various multilateral order-making attempts across IOs, global and regional ordering dynamics through IOs, and the roles international bureaucrats play in these processes. These contributions help identify new directions of inquiry in the study of IOs and international order by, for example, demonstrating that actors can engage with competition and cooperation simultaneously. Not all ordering attempts are equally likely to radically change global politics.

How is China’s rise leaving its mark on the practices, norms and institutions of international politics? In their article, “China and the Logic of Illiberal Hegemony”, Darren J. Lim and G. John Ikenberry offer a provocative answer to this question. Lim and Ikenberry set out to identify “the logic and practices of an ideal-type order that most closely suits China’s preferences.” They distil three organizational principles or logics that could characterize a potential Chinese model of international order: the logic of difference, the logic of win-win, and the logic of partnerships. The authors argue that while such logics may not be illiberal per se, by attracting autocratic state followers and being based on pragmatic interstate bargaining rather than formal institutions, they may generate illiberal outcomes over time. If this argumentation holds, it raises considerable doubt about the sustainability of liberal international order in the face of China’s continued rise.